This article develops the concept of 'extra-institutional religion' to describe how some religiously committed individuals practise religion in a 'post-Catholic' Ireland. Rooted in an island-wide study, it describes extra-institutional religion as the practice of religion outside or in addition to the Catholic Church, Ireland's historically dominant religious institution. As a new concept, extra-institutional religion provides an alternative to the theoretical emphasis on religious individualisation advocated by sociologists of religion and general theorists like Ulrich Beck. It builds on the concepts of British sociologists of religion Grace Davie ('believing without belonging' and 'vicarious religion') and Abby Day ('believing in belonging' and 'performative religion'). It argues that extra-institutional religion may have application outside Ireland in the mixed religious markets of Europe. Extra-institutional religion also may contribute to wider change by balancing its two structural strengths: its position on the margins, and its continued links with institutional religion.
Introduction
The dominance of secularisation theory within the sociology of religion has given way to approaches which recognise secularising patterns alongside plural religious markets and religious individualisation (Pollack, 2008) . While Pollack (2008: 169) has argued that secularisation theories do not claim that secularisation is 'inevitable,' 'irreversible,' or 'desirable', they do assert that it is 'probable', especially in Europe. This raises a question:
will religion retain any social significance in Europe? 3 A dramatic change in how many sociologists thought about secularisation, especially those outside the subfield of the sociology of religion, was reflected in the publication of the late Ulrich Beck's (2010) A God of One's Own. Now, one of the world's leading theorists of reflexive modernity was arguing for a central social role for religion, even in Europe. Beck highlighted religion's potential to produce ethical, reflexive individuals who could contribute to a peaceful cosmopolitan world.
As a prominent general theorist who late in his career advocated the social importance of religion, Beck's 'conversion' seems to confirm that the sociology of religion is more than the sociology of secularisation. Brewer (2018) argues that scholars from outside the subfield like Beck, Jurgen Habermas and Craig Calhoun have fuelled the turn to reflexive religious individualisation among sociologists of religion. Reflexive religious individualisation is characterised by a turn to choice and experience, alongside a cosmopolitanisation of belief which Beck believed equipped religion for an age of pluralism and global risk. On the other hand, Beck has been critiqued for simplistic depictions of religion (Speck, 2012) . While Beck contrasted the reflexively religious individual with fundamentalists, he did not adequately acknowledge the problem of fundamentalism nor offer extensive analysis of the causes of religious violence. Yet it could be argued that A God of One's Own has fed into a burgeoning literature in which reflexive religious individualisation is replacing secularisation as the most important paradigm for explaining contemporary religious change (Marti, 2015; Marti and Ganiel, 2014) . Religious individualisation is not limited to the form analysed in Paul Heelas and Linda The Spiritual Revolution, which focused on alternative or new age spiritualities. Reflexive religious individualisation also includes those who still identify in some ways with Christian identities.
In addition, studies of 'lived religion' or 'every day religion' have downplayed the importance of religious institutions (Ammerman, 2013; McGuire, 2008) . Even the subfield of 4 Christian congregational studies has de-emphasised the importance of denominations, except perhaps in relation to the demarcation between Catholics and Protestants (Guest, Tusting and Woodhead, 2004 ; for an exception see Richter, 2004) . The emphasis on individualisation has highlighted that conventional approaches in the sociology of religion, like measuring declines in church attendance and belief in ideas such as God, heaven and hell, do not adequately explain individuals' practices and beliefs -nor their social impacts.
In the study of religion on the island of Ireland on which this article is based, individualisation alone could not explain how people were practising their religion. 1 So I
developed the concept of 'extra-institutional religion' to describe how some individuals who are relatively committed to religion practice it in a 'post-Catholic' Ireland. My earlier book introduced this concept (Ganiel, 2016a) . This article grounds it more deeply in relevant debates, clarifying and refining its utility and theoretical potential. As explained below, extrainstitutional religion is a provisional concept, based on empirical data from a limited study in
Ireland. I define extra-institutional religion as the practice of religion outside or in addition to European contexts. Extra-institutional religion also may contribute to wider change by balancing its two structural strengths: its position on the margins, and its continued links with institutional religion.
Mixed religious markets
A long-standing debate in the sociology of religion has been between advocates of secularisation and advocates of Rational Choice Theories (RCT), sometimes called market theories. RCT developed to counter the once-dominant secularisation theories, in particular to explain why the United States was not following what was assumed to be the normative European pattern of secularisation (Blasi, 2009 (Stark and Iannaccone, 1994; Finke and Stark, 2003) . For them, the churches of Europe-well-endowed by the state and too lazy to compete for adherents-withered away. In the United States, with its early separation of church and state, religious groups compete in a crowded market, and are ambitious for souls.
But there is an alternative perspective on Europe and the decline of its religious monopolies: European societies also have religious markets; they are just different from the free-wheeling religious market of the United States Gauthier and Martikainen, 2016 (Davie, 2015: 205) . She identifies six 'factors to take into account' when analysing religion in Britain, arguing that they apply to almost all European societies (Davie, 2015: 3-4) . For this article her first two factors are most important: the role of the historic churches in shaping British culture; and an awareness that these churches still have a place at particular moments in the lives of British people, though they are no longer able to influence-let alone discipline-the beliefs and behaviour of the majority.
There is lively debate about Davie's and Day's concepts (Bruce and Voas, 2010; Cotter, Davie, Beckford, Chattoo, Lovheim, Vasquez, and Day, 2016; Laniel, 2016; Pollack, 2008; Voas and Crockett, 2005; Voas, 2009) . It is beyond the scope of this article to fully review these debates. But it should be noted that some sociologists of religion remain convinced that the terminal decline of religion remains Europe's dominant story (Bruce, 2001 ). For them, religious individualisation supports secularisation by privatising religion and negating its social and political importance. Others argue that secularisation is not so straightforward (Berger, 2014; Martin, 2005; Woodhead, 2016; Winkel and Ganiel, 2017) .
They recognise that though religion has declined in important ways, it remains significant. (Jones and Ganiel, 2012) . Religious ideas and practices informed the oppositional ethno-national identities that characterised the most recent period of violence, the 'Troubles ', circa 1969 ', circa -1998 ', circa (Mitchell, 2006 . In this article, I use post-Catholic as an empirical description of such trends, not an epochal one. I am not arguing that Ireland was once Catholic, and now it is not. Rather, a particular form of Irish Catholicism has been displaced. This was a Catholicism that had a monopoly on the religious market, was a defining characteristic of national identity, had a 14 strong relationship with state power (in the Republic), elevated the status of priests to exceptionally high levels, and emphasised the evils of sexual sin (Inglis, 2014 (Inglis, , 1998 Fuller, 2004 recognised that religion is not going away, and will continue to influence society and politics.
In post-Catholic Ireland, Catholicism is important but no longer monopolises the religious market. The Catholic Church is part of a mixed religious market, where there are more options available than in the past. The expressions of faith were selected for theoretical reasons: I wanted a focused sample of people with committed religious practice, so the groups and congregations were chosen because I thought they would put us in touch with such people. Some case studies were generated through responses to the surveys (respondents were asked if they would participate in further research); others were located through my own and associated researchers' embedded knowledge. In this way, my project can be contrasted to Inglis' study, discussed above, which did not seek out people whose religious practice was especially important to them. My analysis of the interviews with these relatively religiously-committed individuals inspired the concept of extra-institutional religion.
Methods and conceptual development
The most striking aspect of the interviews was that people could not stop talking about the Catholic Church. This was especially interesting because my questions focused on their personal faith or the particular local expression of religion with which they were involved. Although we did not ask specifically about the Catholic Church, people were eager to explain how they were engaging with it in ways that seemed to allow them to divorce themselves from what they called the 'institution.' For example, people who frequented the Benedictine monastery spoke about the monks there in positive terms -as if they were separate from the 'institutional' church, which they spoke of in negative terms (Ganiel, 2015) . People on the Parish Pastoral Council (PPC) in Ballyboden demarcated their parish and their 'good' priests from the 'institutional' church of the Irish bishops and the Vatican.
Even in non-Catholic cases, people explicitly (and unprompted) contrasted their own faith to Irish Catholicism (Ganiel, 2016b) . Simply put, in some people's minds, the 'institutional'
16 church was a dry and lifeless hierarchy. So they ignored it and found vitality instead in religious spaces (some of which were recognisably Catholic) which they perceived as outside the institution as they defined it. In this way, I learned about the methods and strategies people were using to keep their faith alive, outside or in addition to the Catholic Church, and began to conceive of these practices as extra-institutional religion.
People practised extra-institutional religion on the margins of Ireland's religious market; indeed, extra-institutional expressions of religion were usually small and often unnoticed. Inglis' study, for example, did not find many people in such spaces (Inglis, 2014: 149): '… it would seem that there is little attempt by most Irish Catholics to stimulate and invigorate their religious beliefs and practices. It may be that the church's domination of the religious field for so long has led to a form of religious disability. The laity were, for so long, in Ireland is that the Church is the Church hierarchy and it, not the laity, owns and controls the institution and the larger Catholic tradition' (Dillon, 2014: 119) .
Extra-institutional religion was an exception to these trends. Those who practised it were attempting to invigorate beliefs and practices, and they had -however unusually among
Irish laity -imbibed the idea of the Church as the People of God. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide full descriptive data to support the concept of extra-institutional religion. Readers seeking more substantial evidence may refer to the book based on the project (Ganiel, 2016a) . Two brief examples will provide a sense of how extra-institutional religion was practiced.
Patricia was a member of the PPC in Ballyboden. 5 She recognised the role the institutional church had played over her life. She praised some nuns and priests who served in her local area. She was inspired by Vatican II, the set readings for mass, and even mass itself.
Yet she distinguished between her personal experiences of faith, which included taking responsibility for interpreting the bible and connecting with other like-minded Catholics in small groups like the PPC; and the institutional church, which she saw as having betrayed not Slí Eile, which means 'another way' in Irish, was a ministry for 18 to 35-year-old
Catholics that focused on the themes of spirituality, social justice, and community; and featured a popular gospel mass at the Jesuits' Gardiner Street Church in Dublin. As a Jesuit ministry, it was embedded in the institutional church. But the young people who participated in it did not think of it that way. The Catholic Church had been tarnished in their eyes, and Slí Eile seemed to exist in a space outside or in addition to it. Some spoke of Slí Eile as an alternative to parish life, while others saw it as an addition to their parish. They said it was a safe space to express their doubts, and explore their faith in a holistic and intelligent way. 
The theoretical potential of extra-institutional religion
Given that extra-institutional religion is so deeply rooted in the Irish case, I am framing it as a provisional concept, with the potential to explain religious practice in other European countries. Its theoretical potential resides in: 1) its ability to describe how some religiously committed individuals practice religion outside or in addition to historic state churches; and 19 2) its potential to contribute to wider change by balancing its two structural strengths: its position on the margins, and its continued links with institutional religion. groups, working outside institutional churches, which contributed most to peacemaking. They were effective because they offered a credible critique of evangelicalism and its existing ideologies and institutions; and because they formed networks that enabled them to spread their ideas and practices beyond the margins (Ganiel, 2008) . These examples demonstrate that those on the margins must communicate with the mainstream in order to contribute to wider change.
Extra-institutional religion's potential to contribute to wider changes also depends on the extent to which a particular society is open to contributions from explicitly religious activists -a point made by Habermas (2008) . Motivated by his concern that religion should not be excluded from democratic deliberation in plural societies, Habermas developed some rules of engagement for religious and secular citizens interacting with each other in the public sphere. Habermas expected both religious and secular citizens to be self-critical about their own traditions, and open to the insights of the other. For the religious, this means reflecting on their own traditions in the light of reason. For the secular, this means resisting the temptation to be secularistic, recognising the historical contributions of religion to reason, and refraining 'from passing judgment on religious truths' (Habermas, 2008: 140) .
Interaction between religious and secular citizens is expected to produce a 'complementary learning process' that is mutually enriching (Habermas, 2008: 144) .
Habermas' distinction between religious and secular citizens is problematic. Indeed, the concepts of vicarious and performative religion outlined in this article in many ways collapse the distinction between the religious and the secular (Beckford, 2012) . It also is not clear if Habermas fully appreciates the difficulties his rules of engagement pose for citizens motivated by their faith, or the challenges for them in working with those with whom they fundamentally disagree on some issues. In Habermas' public sphere, it seems religious citizens are at times required to suspend aspects of their identities and beliefs or to translate them for secular citizens; while similar tasks are not required of secular citizens. Habermas also provides little sense of how activists motivated by religion strike a balance between critiquing their own tradition, drawing on religious resources to create inspiring alternatives; while at the same time remaining in dialogue with other groups. Extra-institutional expressions of religion have the potential to enact the how that Habermas neglects, as they strive to strike the balance that his rules of engagement demand.
Conclusion
Despite secularising trends, religion has persisted across European societies. We need concepts to explain how religion continues to function, even as people's religious practices change and adapt. Extra-institutional religion describes how some individuals who are committed to religion practice it in a post-Catholic Ireland: they practice it outside and in addition to the institutional Catholic Church. Having said that, extra-institutional religion is agnostic on questions about the character of wider change. Extra-institutional religion could be practised by cosmopolitan religious actors advocating peace and pluralism; indeed, the nature of my study in Ireland was such that these people were over-represented among the interviewees. But extrainstitutional religion also could be practised by fundamentalists and religious nationalists seeking change through coercion and violence. Finally, it is worth reiterating that extrainstitutional religion is a provisional concept. It is empirically untested outside Ireland; and even in Ireland, there is not strong empirical evidence of its ability to contribute to wider change. Further research is needed to challenge or confirm the utility of the concept, in
Ireland and other European contexts.
